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The Quality of Real Assets, Liquidation Value and Debt Capacity
Abstract
We use real estate rms to examine how asset liquidation values inuence a rms
debt capacity, since the productivity and quality of each asset is observable and po-
tential measures of an assets liquidation value are easier to ascertain ex-ante. We
show that compared to rms that issue equity, rms that issue debt have higher asset
quality. The e¤ect of their expected asset liquidation value is signicant, even after
we control for other factors that inuence nancing decisions. For rms whose assets
quality is not easily observable, we nd that rmsnancing choices depend heavily on
conditions in the overall real asset market. (JEL: G3, R0, G33)
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The illiquidity of corporate assets poses a signicant private cost to rms that choose
to nance with debt. When a rm is in nancial distress and has to liquidate its assets,
potential industry buyers, e.g., peers within the same industry, are also likely to be nancially
constrained or experiencing similar business di¢ culties, thus they cannot pay full value
for the assets. Shleifer and Vishny (1992), who explore the e¤ect of liquidation values on
corporate debt capacity, predict that rms with relatively more illiquid assets will prefer
equity nancing to debt, ex ante. In this paper, we test the Shleifer and Vishny hypothesis
that asset liquidation values inuence rms nancing choices. We do so by examining the
incremental nancing decisions of real estate rms, the real estate investment trusts (REITs).
We choose to focus on real estate rms rather than ordinary corporations to analyze
the role that asset liquidation values play in determining a rms nancial contracts. We
do so for several reasons. First, prior studies have used commercial real estate to test the
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) hypothesis. As Benmelech, Garmaise, and Moskowitz (2005)
note, the real estate market is a natural candidate for testing nancial contracting, given
its high levels of debt coupled with potential measures of an assets liquidation value, which
is usually di¢ cult to ascertain ex ante. In addition, relative to most industries, REITs are
more homogeneous and o¤er greater transparency (see, e.g., Capozza and Seguin, 1999)
with respect to their operations and assets. In contrast to other types of corporations, the
comparative advantage of using REITs is that the productivity, asset quality, and other asset
characteristics, all essential features in determining an assets liquidation value and optimal
nancing of a project are observable for each asset (property). Further, real estate constitutes
a nontrivial portion of the assets held on the balance sheet of corporations. According to
Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2010), 58 percent of U.S. public rms in 1993 reported at least
some real estate ownership, with real estate accounting for 19 percent of these rmstotal
market value. Thus, our analysis may provide new insights on the redeployability of assets
and liquidation value for other industries with tangible xed assets (property, plant, and
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equipment, PP&E). Furthermore, as Campello and Giambona (2010) point out, among the
various categories of tangible assets, the real estate component of PP&E (land and buildings)
has the most explanatory power over leverage.
Market participants have long recognized the importance of asset quality in the price for-
mation process in addition to the role that tenant quality and the diversity of di¤erent types
of industries in a given location known as the economic base have as important determinants
of asset quality. The actions of Bill Ackman, the CEO of hedge fund Pershing Square Capital
Management LP, represent one example that market participants do recognize the quality-
price relationship. In an October 6, 2009 presentation of Realty Income (ticker symbol O)
entitled ONo!, Ackman announced that he is shorting the real estate investment trust
(REIT) because he believes that Realty Income Corp has issues with tenant quality. As
evidence of poor tenant quality/credit ratings, his presentation notes that not only is there a
high concentration of discretionary, regional retail tenants (casual dining restaurants, movie
theaters, day care centers, etc. . . ) that have been hard hit in the recession but there are
also some of the largest tenants have junk or unrated credits with high leverage (bankruptcy
potential). In addition to this, the report goes on to say that
unlike many other REITs, Realty Income does not disclose its tenants1. There is limited
transparency as to: names of tenants, credit of tenants, average credit rating of total tenant
pool, and individual tenant contribution to revenue. Analysts and investors have asked
for more tenant disclosure, but the Company has refused. Question: Why? Answer: We
believe that Os tenant quality is poor and the company is concerned about the impact of
transparency on its stock price
This suggests to him that the dividend will probably get cut and investors will be hurt2.
Asset quality is not only important in predicting future REIT performance but it is also
1For comparison purposes, Ackman notes that Simon Property Group, for example, discloses tenants
representing as little as 0.2% of its minimum rental income.
2Once word of his presentation got out, shares were down over 7% at one point on Wednesday.
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a critical factor in the asset liquidation process. The key objective of the FDIC resolution
process is to identity and to implement the disposition of the failed nancial institutions
assets that is least costly to the deposit insurance fund. According to Schi¤man (2009), the
FDIC recognizes asset quality as a determinant in setting the reserve price since this is one
of the factors used in grouping assets into pools. The reserve price (minimum bid) is then
assigned based on the value of the underlying collateral of each pool to achieve the maximum
recovery in liquidation. Besides this, in an April 12, 2007 report entitled INDUS (ECLIPSE
2007-1) plc, the bond rating agency DBRS3 was of the opinion that
property quality grades of above average or excellent . . . are more capable of retaining
and attracting tenants and thus more liquid in a stressed market. . . The highest-quality
properties within a market have lower probabilities of default because they are more likely
to be viable and attractive to new tenants, increasing cash ow stability. To evaluate property
quality, DBRS considers the location, the functional utility of the asset . . . 
The recent bankruptcy of mall operator General Growth Properties (GGP) provides
further evidence of the impact that asset quality has on the value of real estate. Faced with
dwindling options for managing its $25+ billion in short-term mortgage debt coming due
within a year, GGP led for bankruptcy on April 16, 2009. It was the largest real estate
bankruptcy since 1980. In commenting on GGPs bankruptcy, the New York Times noted
that Few analysts dispute the quality of General Growths malls, which include the Ala
Moana Center in Honolulu, Water Tower Place in Chicago and the Grand Canal Shoppes at
the Venetian in Las Vegas. But its undoing was the mounting pile of short-term mortgages
the operator used to expand.GGPs high quality assets resulting from high quality tenants
and prime locations resulted in a bidding war between Simon Property Group and Brookeld
Asset Management with the former suitor raising its price three times in their unsuccessful
3DBRS is a rating agency that rates companies and single-purpose vehicles that issue commercial pa-
per, term debt and preferred shares in the global capital markets. For further information, please visit
http://www.dbrs.com/about.
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bid. Given its asset quality, GGP was able to negotiate one large equity commitment instead
of trying to sell o¤ assets piecemeal during its reorganization. According to Chris Macke,
senior real estate strategist with the CoStar Group, Trying to sell the malls one by one would
likely have taken much longer than a year and might have forced the company to accept deep
discounts on its assets . This is consistent with Shleifer and Vishnys (1992) liquidation
value concept; with good assets, its competitors want the assets. Debt capacity is also higher,
which is why GGP was in trouble. Due to good asset quality, GGP left bankruptcy on Nov.
8, 2010 splitting itself into two independent and publicly traded companies. Its namesake, a
REIT (the NewGGP) comprised of 170 core regional malls and 65 additional properties (strip
centers and o¢ ces that will be sold) and Howard Hughes Corp., (NYSE:HHC), an operating
company focusing on the development of master planned communities and shopping centers.
Using prior research4 as our starting point, we examine the variation in debt capacity
relative to the determinants of liquidation value by focusing on asset quality. The potential
quality of a rms asset includes an analysis of both tenant quality and the sustainability
of the cash ows associated with the asset over the business cycle rather than the potential
buyers of such assets. The reason goes to the issue of value in best use, since the asset (in this
case, real estate) consists of a bundle of existing and future lease contracts. Consequently,
the tenant quality and the economic base of the local real estate market a¤ect whether asset
sales are at prices below the value in best use. Since real estate is xed in its location, the
health of the local economy inuences the cash ow of the tenant and hence its decision to
remain in its contract. Therefore, potential buyers face a decision on assessing the value in
best use, given the quality of the asset in question relative to the desirability of the local
region. This emphasis is the distinguishing feature of our study. We theoretically prove and
4Our work builds on earlier research that empirically tests the e¤ect of liquidation value on a rms capital
structure choices. For example, Benmelech and Bergman (2008), who study the U.S. airline industry and
Benmelech (2009), who examines the 19th century American railroad industry, nd that rms with more
saleable real assets and redeployable collateral tend to have lower costs of external nancing and longer
maturities associated with debt nancing.
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empirically test the notion that asset quality, which we measure by tenant nancial stability,
together with the industry concentration structure of the local real estate market, determines
the liquidation value of real estate and a rms nancing choices. Our fundamental measures
of asset liquidation value include the industry concentration of local markets, which captures
the long-term zoning exibility notion of Benmelech, Garmaise, and Moskowitz (2005) and a
measure of tenant nancial stability, which reects the short-run or intermediate-term asset
quality.
Our model also predicts a set of market indicators that should inuence asset liquidation
value. In equilibrium, capital market participants should observe the fundamental informa-
tion of asset qualities and react to them accordingly. We propose two such market indicators:
the realized loss severity from real estate loans (the historical measure) and the capitalization
rate (a forward-looking measure). We note that the capitalization rate (cap rate), which is
analogous to the inverse of the EBITDA multiple (earnings before interest, taxes, depreci-
ation and amortization divided by enterprise value), is one of the most important market
indicators in real estate (see Plazzi, Torous, and Valkanov, 2010).
Another distinguishing feature of our study is that we use the choice of a rms security
issuance as the dependent variable rather than using leverage ratios. By focusing on a rms
incremental nancing decisions, our approach deals with the persistence problem of using
leverage ratios (see, e.g., Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, 2006), which may yield misleading
coe¢ cients (Strebulaev, 2007).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we provide a reduced-form model of rm
liquidation value. The model helps us disentangle the intrinsic asset characteristics from the
market proxy for liquidation value, which guides the empirical tests. In Section 2, we discuss
four measures of asset liquidation value. In Section 3 we describe our sample and in Section
4 we test the Shleifer and Vishny (1992) hypothesis. Section 5 concludes.
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1 A Model of Firm Liquidation Value
A real estate rm (REIT) operates a portfolio of commercial real estate assets, which gener-
ates a constant cash ow5 of I per unit of time until default. A default event occurs according
to a Poisson process with an exogenous hazard intensity of .
Federal regulations require that REITs must hold at least 75% of its assets in real estate.
Therefore, we assume that the rms value equals the total value of the assets it holds.
We further assume that due to private information, geographical expertise, and reputation
developed in operating the portfolio of real assets, the current rm is the rst-best owner,
in the sense that the real assets under current REIT management generate the highest cash
ows until the event of default.
In fact, the informal arguments that link the rms liquidation value to the best use
of assets are often maintained as the following quotation from Shleifer and Vishny (1992)
indicate:
Because of credit constraints and government regulation of industry buyers, assets would
have to be sold to industry outsiders who dont know how to manage them well, face agency
costs of hiring specialists to run these assets properly. When industry buyers cannot buy
the assets and industry outsiders face signicant costs of acquiring and managing the assets,
assets in liquidation fetch prices below value in best use, which is the value when managed
by specialists.
Formally, if it defaults, the REIT liquidates its portfolio of real assets as a whole to
homogeneous second-best owners in the competitive secondary market. Over time, the new
owners gradually obtain private information, develop expertise, and rebuild the reputation
by managing the assets. Hence, over time, the cash ow reverts to the pre-default level.
We assume that the cash ow generated under the management of the second-best owner is
5In reality, net operating income, which is rental income net of operating expenses, may not be a constant.
We provide an alternative cash ow specication in the Appendix. The major result remains the same.
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(1  e t) I, where  2 (0; 1) captures the instant discount of the cash ow at liquidation;
 measures the speed of cash ow recovery to its pre-default level, and t is the length of time
after default.
All market participants are risk-neutral and discount future cash ows by the constant
risk-free rate, r. The market value of the rm is the sum of the present value of its cash ow
until default and the present value of the liquidation value upon default:
V0 = E0
Z 
0
e rsI ds+ e rV1

, (1)
where we assume the current time is zero and denote  as the time of default. E0 () is the
expectation taken at time 0. V1 is the market value of the liquidating real assets at . V1
is the sum of the present value of the cash ows under a new REIT until the next default
and the present value of the liquidation value upon the next default:
V1 = E0
"Z  0
0
e rt
 
1  e t I dt+ e r 0V1# , (2)
where  0 denotes the time between the rst and the second defaults. The terminal value
is also V1 because upon the second default, the homogeneous and competitive second-best
owners are facing exactly the same situation as the REIT faces at the rst default. Solving
Equation (2), we get the rms liquidation value as:
V1 =
I
r

1   r + 
r + + 

. (3)
To make the rms liquidation value scalable, we normalize the terminal liquidation value V1
by its current market value V0. From Equation (1), we can write the current market value
as
V0 =
1
r + 
(I + V1) (4)
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Therefore the normalized liquidation value is
L  V1
V0
=
(r + )V1
(I + V1)
: (5)
When we examine the determinants that a¤ect this normalized liquidation value, we nd
that the bigger the normalized liquidation value, L, the more likely the real estate rm is to
nance with debt than equity ex ante, according to Shleifer and Vishny (1992).
2 The Measures of Firms Liquidation Value and Predictions of
Debt Capacity
The objective in our study is straightforward: testing Shleifer and Vishnys (1992) hypothesis
on impact of asset liquidation value to rms debt capacity, which summarize in the the
following overarching hypothesis.
The Overarching Hypothesis: Asset liquidation value increases rms debt capacity.
To document such linkage in our sample, it is essential to measure a rms liquidation
value correctly. Our model presented in the previous section not only gives a theoretical
foundation for the determinants of REIT liquidation value, but also provides a framework
to analyze the relation between the rms liquidation value and various market proxies.
The model implies that asset quality and re-sale discount can serve as the fundamental
measures of the rms liquidation value. Furthermore, if there is an information feedback
loop in the capital market, then the prior liquidations from similar assets and some market
indicators of cash ow valuation will also predict the rms liquidation value. Therefore,
we have developed four working hypotheses linking each measure of asset liquidation to the
likelihood of debt issuance.
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2.1 Asset Quality
A higher quality of real assets implies more stable long-term cash ows. In the framework
of our model, the new owner will be able to recover more quickly to the optimal level (I) of
cash ows (larger ). Asset quality, which is intrinsic to rm liquidation value, determines
the speed of cash ow recovery . It follows from Equations (3) and (5) that
@L
@
=
I2 (r + )2
r (I + V1)
2 (r + + )2
> 0. (6)
Therefore, the Equation (6) predicts that asset quality has a positive e¤ect on the normalized
liquidation value.
There are several ways to measure asset quality. Tax regulation requires that at least
95% of REIT gross income must come from rental income or other passive investment such as
Treasuries. Property value is dened as capitalized future rents, which are contracted in the
propertiesleases. Therefore, one way to measure cash ow stability is by its lease maturities.
For example, a rms real assets with long-term leases should have higher quality, because
future cash ows are more stable for the asset owner over a long time period. However, in
reality, the lease term tells only one side of the story.
Giambona, Harding, and Sirmans (2008) adapt the lease maturity structure as a measure
of rm liquidation value. Using a sample of equity REITs, they nd that shorter leases are
likely to have higher liquidation values because the option value of re-leasing and modifying
the property at more favorable conditions to a favorable tenants. However, the lease maturity
is result of bargaining between lessor and lessee and reects a balance between the cash
ow stability and option value. Therefore, the lease expiration structure su¤ers from an
endogeneity problem as a proxy for liquidation value.
Since the lease maturity is endogenously determined, it is not an ideal proxy for asset
liquidation value. We argue that tenant quality is the main driver of asset liquidation value.
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Our reasoning is that there are also costs associated with long-term leases. When the long-
term rent is higher than the market rent, the owner may experience lease defaults. When the
long-term rent is lower than the market rent, the owner does not have the option to adjust
the rent accordingly. Therefore, short-term leases give the property owner more control over
property improvement, restructuring, and renancing exibility. Furthermore, the lease term
and base lease are often bundled with lease escalation, percentage rent, and lease options
(lease renewal, cancellation option, expansion option, etc.). Without other contract terms
such as escalation and the options mentioned above, the lease maturity itself cannot capture
the whole value of lease contract. The argument in Giambona, et al. 2008 holds only in an
up market, but not necessarily in a down market because of the di¢ culty of re-leasing the
space.
Most asset managers believe that the property is only as strong as the tenant (Smith,
2009). The tenant quality was highlighted during the 2007-2009 nancial crisis. In the case
of lease contracts, often referred to as the engines of property values, lease counterparty risk
arises when a tenant with low creditworthiness may not be able to make rental payments.
Therefore, the quality of lease contracts depends on the credit quality of the tenants. A
tenant with better nancial stability implies less counterparty risk, which means higher
asset quality. We measure asset quality with the revenue-weighted Altman Z-score, which
we construct using the historical performance of assets, liabilities, and earnings to predict a
rms probability of default.
To construct such a measure, we focus on the major tenants that provide top 60 percent of
the landlord rms revenue in aggregate and match all publicly traded tenants to Compustat.
We calculate an average tenant Altman Z-score weighted by the percentage contribution of
revenue of each tenant for every REIT rm in our sample.
Thus, our rst hypothesis is as follows:
Working Hypothesis I: A REIT with higher average tenant Z-scores has higher asset
11
quality and higher liquidation value. Therefore, a REIT with higher average tenant Z-scores
tends to nance with debt.
2.2 Firesale Discount
One key problem with illiquid assets like real estate is that a hasty liquidation may cause
signicant private costs to the owner. When a nancially constrained real estate rm wants
to sell a property in a highly concentrated real estate market, it is likely that potential
buyers are in similar nancial distress. Consistent with this argument, real estate appraisers
typically assume that a rapid sale of real estate leads to a liquidation discount (or re-sale
discount), since redeployment of the rms assets is di¢ cult. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) nd
that the liquidation discount is about 15 to 25 percent relative to an orderly sale. Kaplan
(1989) cites Merrill Lynch estimates that the distressed sale of the Campeau retail empire
would bring about 68 percent of what an orderly sale would bring.
In our model, we capture such a liquidation discount by , which represents an immediate
drop in the generated cash ows at the time of liquidation. Based on Equations (3) and (5),
we get
@L
@
=   I
2 (r + )2
r (I + V1)
2 (r + + )
< 0. (7)
Therefore, our model predicts a negative e¤ect of the liquidation discount on the normalized
liquidation value.
Real estate assets are immobile and location quality is an important component of the
asset quality. In our analysis, we measure the resale discount using an average ratio of
the industry concentration of a REITs top markets. Each local market is dened as a
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The United States O¢ ce of Management and Budget
(OMB) denes an MSA as one or more adjacent counties or county equivalents that have
at least one urban core area of at least 50,000 population, plus adjacent territory that has a
high degree of social and economic integration with the core as measured by commuting ties.
12
The OMB has dened 366 MSAs in the U.S. For example, the New York metropolitan area
(the New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island MSA), which is the largest MSA in the
U.S., includes ten counties in New York State, twelve counties in Northern and Central New
Jersey, and one county in northeastern Pennsylvania. The idea is that REITs that invest in
areas with a high industry concentration (less diversied mix of industries in a given locale)
may have to o¤er a deeper discount to sell their assets, because the potential buyers may be
su¤ering the same nancial di¢ culty. For example, the redeployability of real estate assets
in Detroit is much lower than in other areas, as most businesses in Detroit are associated
with the auto industry.
Using commercial property zoning exibility as a proxy for liquidation values, Benmelech,
Garmaise, and Moskowitz (2005) nd that higher liquidation values are associated with
longer term loans, a smaller number of creditors, higher loan-to-value ratios, and lower
interest rates. Although the exibility in zoning designation that governs permitted uses of
a property, is associated with the potential level of property redeployability, such e¤ects might
tend to inuence the liquidation value in the long run. In fact, the exibility option alluded to
in Benmelech et al. (2005) is typically out of the money except when the age of the building is
such that the building is in need of rehabilitation or can be torn down. Due to the long-term
durability of real estate asset, when facing nancing choices rms may be more interested
in the determinants of liquidation value at short or intermediate horizons. In the short or
intermediate term, there is a greater emphasis around asset quality such as the quality of
tenants in a space. In a long-run market equilibrium, the zoning restriction and the local
economic base should be integrated in a region that provides a unique industry structure.
Therefore the industry concentration structure captures the long-run attractiveness of a
market.
To construct a proxy of location quality, we rst obtain the top ten markets for each
REIT. Following Hirschman (1964), for eachMSAwe calculate a Herndahl-Hirschman Index
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(HHI), HHI =
PN
i=1 E
2
i
(
P
Ei)
2 ; where Ei is the number of employees in each industry category of
a particular MSA. A higher HHI means a higher industry concentration. Doing so makes it
possible for us to measure the extent of local real estate market diversication and industry
concentration. If the labor force is wholly concentrated in a single industry, then the index
is one. With the revenue-weighted average of the local market HHI as a proxy for re-sale
discount, we have our second hypothesis.
Working Hypothesis II: A higher industry concentration for a REITs property mar-
kets is associated with higher resale discount upon liquidation. Therefore, rms with lower
average industry concentration ratios are more likely to nance with debt.
If the market is more or less e¢ cient, some of the information about asset quality and
attractiveness of real estate markets should be priced in realized liquidations. We also test
our hypotheses by using the realized loss severity rate on securitized commercial mortgages.
2.3 Loss Severity Rate
We can also infer the asset liquidation value from realized foreclosures. Assuming that the
historical liquidations indicate future performance, we use the realized loss severity rate6 of
publicly traded commercial mortgage backed security (CMBS) as a proxy of REITsasset
liquidation value.
We note that there may be some di¤erence in liquidation values between properties
collateralized in portfolio loans compared to those securitized in CMBS deals. However,
the loss severity rates extracted in CMBS deals still provide a useful market measure for
liquidation value across property types and over time. Thus, as a measure of loss severity,
we exploit the average loss severity by property type from foreclosed real assets in securitized
CMBS deals, provided by the U.S. structured products research of LehmanLive7. We build
6The loss severity rate of a defaulted CMBS is dened as the present value of its lifetime losses (both
interest and principal losses) as a percentage of principal balance, measured at either the origination date or
the default date.
7LehmanLive becomes Barclays Capital Live after the Lehman Brothers was liquidated and acquired by
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a realized CMBS loss severity indicator for each REIT according to its real asset exposure
to test our third hypothesis.
Working Hypothesis III: A lower realized CMBS loss severity rate of a REIT indicates
higher asset liquidation value. Therefore, rms with lower realized CMBS loss severity are
more likely to nance with debt ex-ante.
3 Sample Data and Descriptive Analysis
The variable of interest is the choice of incremental nancing, i.e., debt or equity. The data
on REITsincremental nancing decisions are from SNL Real Estate, which covers all equity
REITs public security o¤erings from January 2000 through December 2009. SNL Real
Estate provides detailed information on REIT investments, rm nancial characteristics, as
well as information on geographical distribution of properties and tenant exposures; most of
this information is not available on Compustat.
There are 2,150 new issues, including 921 bond issues and 1,229 equity issues from 183
REITs during the 20002009 period. We derive accounting information, such as total book
assets, total debt, and returns on average assets, from Compustat, complemented when
necessary by SNL Real Estate. Among the four ingredients of our liquidation value measures,
the key factor is tenant quality. However, since some properties (e.g., hotels and apartments)
do not have corporate tenants whose stock is publicly traded, the nal sample contains 1,043
new o¤erings, which consist of 484 bond issues and 559 equity issues from 102 REITs. On
average, there is one issue per rm per year. For properties that are run by an operating
company,8 or are mixed use, we use the operators quality to represent the tenant quality.
We believe that for hotels, apartments, and other property types with transient tenants,
Barclay Capital in 2009. We also use a similar index from Standard and Poors CMBS Quarterly Insights.
The results are essentially the same. We thank John Harding for providing Standard and Poors CMBS
quarterly data of loan defaults and losses.
8For example some hotel properties of Hospitality Properties Trust (HPT) are run by Hyatt Hotel Corp.,
or Intercontinental Hotels Group.
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a property managed by a more e¢ cient operator should have higher asset quality. In the
robustness checks, the historical loss severity rate is used, which has 1,300 observations.
[Put Table1 here]
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of security issuances by equity REITs between
January 2000 and December 2009. Panel A reports the number of issuances and the number
of rms that issue securities by REIT property type. SNL Real Estate denes eight property
types: retail (including shopping centers, regional malls, and other retail outlets), o¢ ce,
industrial, apartment, lodging, health care, diversied, and other special property types.
Since most REITs invest in one type of real estate, the industry often classies REITs by
the property type on which they focus. Panel B reports the number of issuances and the
number of rms that issue securities by issuing year. Total issuance of public o¤erings is
clustered in o¢ ces and shopping centers. There is also an apparent time variation in the
average number of security issues per rm. The average peaks in 2004 with 179 total issues.
[Put Table 2 here]
Table 2 presents the distribution of new security issues by REIT property focus (panel A)
and by issuing year (panel B). REITs that choose to issue bonds are larger in size than REITs
that issue equity. This phenomenon is consistent with the general notion that large rms are
more likely to have access to the bond markets than small rms. The apartment sector, which
has special access to the debt market through government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), and
the o¢ ce and retail sectors, have the most debt o¤erings per rm. The health care9 and
apartment sectors, which normally do not have long-term tenants, have the most equity
o¤erings per rm. The sample for the 2004-2005 period had the highest issuing intensity
in debt with three bond o¤erings per rm. Over the 2006 to 2008 period, there were more
equity issues per rm (almost two issues per rm) then debt issues.
9Health care sector include senior housing and assisted-living facilities.
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[Put Table 3 here]
The four panels in Table 3 report the summary statistics of measures of asset liquidation
value by property type (panels A and B) and by issuing year (C and D). Panels A and C
describe the fundamental measures of asset liquidation value of a REIT. For the fundamental
measures of liquidation value, the industry concentration ratios are stable over time, since
those equilibrium industry structures tend to take e¤ect over the long run. Diversied REITs
have the highest concentration ratios (on average, 9.67%) indicating that rms operating in
markets in which industries are more concentrated tend to diversify their property types.
The tenant quality declines over the period from 2000 to 2008, and then increases slightly
in 2009. The health care sector has the lowest tenant Z-score (1.3) while the retail sector
has the highest tenant Z-score (5-6). Panels B and D describe the market measures of asset
liquidation value of a REIT. Cap rates decline over the 2000 to 2005 period and then rise
from 2006 onwards, showing that the cap rate is forward-looking. For the market measures
of liquidation value, the hotel sector has the highest cap rate and highest loss severity. It is
consistent with the industry consensus that hotels are the riskiest asset class due to the lack
of long-term tenants (e.g., many rent rooms for just one night). Apartments appear to have
the lowest cap rate and loss severity.
4 Empirical Analysis
Based on the model of REIT liquidation value presented in Section 1 and empirical spec-
ications of liquidation measures presented in Section 2, we test our four hypotheses by
using multivariate logit regressions. Furthermore, we control for the common determinants
of capital structure.
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4.1 Controlling Competitive Explanations
To conduct our formal regression analysis, we control for determinants of nancing choice
that are commonly used in the capital structure literature: the e¤ects of the trade-o¤ theory
(leverage ratio), the pecking order theory (protability, growth opportunity), the market
timing theory (market-to-book ratio), and signaling (dilution). Fixed costs associated with
a new debt issue are lower for large rms, which makes debt nancing more appealing to
them. Therefore, we control for variables such as rm size, measured as the logarithm of a
rms book assets. We also consider alternative measures of these control variables for our
robustness checks.
4.1.1 Trade-o¤ theory
The trade-o¤ theory, rst proposed by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), hypothesizes that
rms weigh the benets (e.g., tax savings) against the costs (e.g., deadweight bankruptcy
costs) of debt, i.e., rms design each incremental nancing activity to adjust their overall
leverage ratios towards optimal target levels. Hence, they can gradually eliminate the devi-
ations from the target. A rm in need of external nance should issue equity if its leverage
ratio is above the target and issue debt if it is below. Thus, we control for the targeting
behavior of corporate nancing choice by using the leverage ratio of the rm. (For example,
Flannery and Rangan, 2006, and Lewellen, 2006).
4.1.2 Pecking order theory
Myers and Majlufs (1984) pecking order theory states that when facing nancing needs,
rms prioritize their sources of nancing. Internal funds are used rst, and when those
funds are depleted, the rm issues debt. When the debt capacity is reached, the rm issues
equity.
Because protable rms have a nancial surplus, the pecking order theory predicts an
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inverse relation between protability and leverage (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Fama and
French, 2002). Protable rms mainly use internal nancing when necessary; hence their
use of external sources of nancing is low. The negative association between protability
and leverage that supports the pecking order theory has been empirically documented by
Myers (1984), Baskin (1989), Friend and Lang (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995).
To control for the inverse relation between the protability and leverage ratio, we include
a measure of protability, the return on average assets (ROAA). We also control for a rms
growth, which we measure as the growth rate of funds from operations (FFO). The FFO is
a measure of REITsoperating performance that is calculated by adding depreciation and
amortization expenses to earnings. FFO gives us a clearer idea of a REITs cash performance,
which is a better measure of the REITs performance than is earnings.
4.1.3 Market timing theory
Baker and Wurgler (2002) explore the managerspractice of timing the equity market, and
nd evidence for this policy. They demonstrate that market timing implies that not only
does the market-to-book ratio a¤ect capital structure through equity issues, but also that
the negative e¤ect is persistent and helps to explain the cross-sectional variation in leverage.
These e¤ects cannot be explained by capital structure theories. We include the market-to-
book ratio to control for the market timing e¤ect.
4.1.4 Signaling
In the pecking order model, good-quality rms use internal funds to avoid the adverse selec-
tion problem and the loss of value. However, these rms are not able to signal their quality
by using capital structure. Another strand of capital structure theory proposed by Ross
(1977) posits that capital structure serves as a signal of private information. Rosss argu-
ment is that equity issuance signals that the stock is overpriced. To avoid such a signaling
e¤ect, companies with major nancing needs tend to prefer debt.
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To control for the signaling e¤ect, we include dilution as a control variable. We compute
dilution as the total amount of new issues divided by total market cap one quarter prior to
the security o¤ering (Asquith and Mullins, 1986).
Table 4 summarizes the predicted e¤ects on the rms nancing decisions.
[Put Table 4 here]
4.2 The Results
We use a univariate analysis to investigate the e¤ect of liquidation value on nancing choice.
Table 5 summarizes the descriptive statistics of our measures of rmsliquidation values and
the explanatory variables used in the multivariate analysis.
[Put Table 5 here]
The Pearson correlation matrix reported in Table 6 show that the correlations between
these explanatory variables is moderate at best; most of the correlations are low for our
primary variables of interests, especially tenant quality. For example, the correlations be-
tween tenant quality and the controls for alternative capital structure theories (leverage,
protability, market-to-book, dilution, FFO growth, and size) are within 8%.The evidence
supports our claim that tenant quality is a better proxy for liquidation value. The correla-
tion between MSA industry concentration and tenant quality is -0.08, which supports our
empirical method of jointly testing short- and long-run measures of asset liquidation value.
The correlation between tenant quality and the cap rate and loss severity are -0.20 and
-0.13, respectively. This result is not surprising, since the capital market captures some of
information conveyed from fundamental measures of asset quality.
[Put Table 6 here]
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In Table 7, we compare the distributions of asset liquidation value measures and other
explanatory variables and test for signicant di¤erences between debt o¤erings and equity
o¤erings. The results suggest that on average, relative to REITs that issue equity, REITs
that raise funds by issuing bonds have a larger market capitalization, lower current market
leverage ratios, lower FFO growth, smaller o¤ering amounts relative to the value of book
assets, and higher market-to-book ratios.
[Put Table 7 here]
4.2.1 Multivariate Logit Analysis
We use multivariate logit regression analysis as our primary tool to study the choice of new
security issuance. We set the dependent variable to one for bond issues and zero for equity
issues. We measure the liquidation value with four di¤erent variables: the average tenant
Z-scores, the industry concentration of top markets in which the REIT operates, the rms
capitalization rate, and the rms loss severity from historical CMBS liquidation. According
to our theoretical model, we expect a positive loading on the tenant quality and negative
loadings on the other three measures.
Our control variables include the current market leverage ratio (Leverage), the return
on average assets (Protability), the market-to-book ratio, the o¤ering amount divided by
the market cap (Dilution), the growth rate of funds from operations (FFO growth), and
logarithm of rms book asset (rm size). Our empirical evidence, which is consistent across
all four measures of liquidation value, supports the Shleifer and Vishny (1992) hypothesis.
Firms that issue bonds not only have higher quality tenants (Z-scores) but also hold assets in
real estate markets that tend to have a more diverse mix of industries in a location relative
to the industry concentration associated with equity-o¤ering rms. The relation is reversed
for the capitalization rate and the historical loss severity. These results suggest that higher
expected liquidation values are associated with a higher likelihood of bond issues relative to
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equity issues. The e¤ect is signicant from both statistical and economic perspectives. A
one-standard-deviation increase in the tenant quality is associated with a 5% to 7% higher
probability of issuing debt. The probability increases are about 5% and 3% for a one-
standard-deviation decrease in the cap rate and the loss severity rate, respectively.
[Put Table 8 here]
Table 8 presents the multivariate logit regression results with fundamental measures
of asset liquidation value. Model 1 tests the e¤ects of asset liquidation value using MSA
industry concentration and tenant quality, but does so without controlling proxies for other
capital structure theories. The two fundamental measures are positively associated with
a REITs decision to issue debt. The higher the asset liquidation value (lower industry
concentration and higher tenant quality), the greater the likelihood of debt issuance. The
results are statistically signicant at the 1% level.
The column Change in Probin model 1, which computes the change in probability of
issuing debt for a one-standard-deviation increase in a corresponding variable, also shows the
economic signicance. A one-standard-deviation increase (decrease) in the tenant average
Z-score (industry concentration ratio of REITs top markets) is associated with a 5% (6%)
higher probability that a rm will issue debt. In addition, the rms characteristics also play
an important role in its nancing decisions. Larger rms are more likely to issue debt.
In Model 2 we include the average lease maturity as an additional control. Given tenant
quality, the lease maturity has no e¤ect on a rms nancing choice, which veries our
hypothesis that lease maturity is endogenously determined.
Model 3 further controls for alternative capital structure theories. Our results are con-
sistent with the trade-o¤, pecking order, and signaling theories of capital structure. The
market leverage prior to a new security issue has a signicant negative impact on the use of
bonds. This nding is consistent with the trade-o¤ theory. Our estimates suggest that given
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a one-standard-deviation increase in market leverage, on average a rm is 15% less likely to
issue bonds. Consistent with the pecking order theory, there is a negative relation between
debt nancing and the FFO growth or protability ratio. Our estimates are also consistent
with the signaling hypothesis, under which the rms likelihood of issuing debt increases by
5% if the dilution measure increases by one standard deviation. Conditional on these four
theories, our proxies for asset liquidation value remain signicant on both a statistical and
economical basis.
[Put Table 9 here]
Using the rm-level cap rate and loss severity rate as explanatory variables, in models
4 and 5 in Table 9 we test the e¤ects of nancing choice by using each of the two market
measures of liquidation value separately. Given proxies for trade-o¤, pecking order, market
timing, and signaling theory, the rms market measures of asset liquidation value remain
signicant. A one-standard-deviation increase in the rms cap rate (loss severity rate) is
associated with a 5% (3%) decrease in the probability of issuing debt.
4.2.2 Robustness Checks
To check if tenant quality is a main driver of asset liquidation value, which in turn determines
a rms nancing choice, we perform several robustness tests. We rst check the model
specications 1, 2, and 3 with a tighter sample under sample selection criterion 1. Table
10 shows that the results are consistent with those in Table 8. Tenant quality remains a
signicant driver of a rms nancing choice in this sample, which comprises 863 observations.
Other control variables have similar results, except for the dilution factor, which becomes
nonsignicant. The overall t improves for model 3. Although the sample size is reduced
by 17%, with the same number of regressors the pseudo R2 increases from 19.7% (Table 8
Model 3) to 21.1% (Table 10 Model 3).
23
[Put Table 10 here]
In Table 11 we examine the model specications 4 and 5 with a larger sample under
selection criterion 3. The sample, which comprises 1,448 (1,300) observations, contains all
security o¤erings, in which we can compute both the cap rate (loss severity) and other control
variables. The two samples are much larger than those in the baseline regression (Table 9,
models 4 and 5), but the results are consistent with the baseline results. A one-standard-
deviation decrease in the cap rate (loss severity rate) is associated with a 4% (5%) increase
in the probability of issuing debt. The results become statistically signicant at the 1% level.
[Put table 11 here]
In Table 12 we explore the nancing decision of rms such as hotels, apartments, self-
storage, etc. that do not have long-term tenants. Without tenant information, an funda-
mental measure of asset liquidation value is not possible. We compare the nancing e¤ects
of market measures of liquidation value derived from the cap rate and the loss severity rate.
Model 4 in Table 12 shows that the cap rate is signicant and negatively associated with the
probability of issuing debt. A one-standard-deviation decrease in the cap rate implies a 9%
higher probability of issuing debt. This sensitivity is almost twice as large as the magnitude
in the baseline sample.
Model 5 in the Table 12 shows that a one-standard deviation decrease in the loss severity
measure is associated with a 16% higher probability of issuing debt. This sensitivity is more
than ve times as large as the magnitude in the baseline regression.
The results in the Table 12 indicate that when we cannot directly observe the fundamental
measures of asset quality, the rms nancing choice relies more heavily on market indicators.
If we interpret the magnitude of the coe¢ cient of the cap rate (or loss severity rate) as the
sensitivity of the rms nancing choice to market indicators, then the sensitivities are two
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to ve times as large as those that have an fundamental (or direct) measure of the rms
asset liquidation value.
[Put Table 12 here]
To test whether the tenant quality and location quality are good measures of asset liqui-
dation value, we further control for cash ow volatility and REIT bond ratings. CF Vol is the
standard deviation of FFO over the past three years. Rating Dummy is a dummy variable
that takes a value of 1 if the rm has either a bond rating or a commercial paper rating and
zero otherwise (MacKay and Phillips, 2005, Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, 2008). Model 6
and model 7 in Table 13 are compared with model 3 originally presented in Table 8. Overall,
Table 13 indicates that the model with addtional controls does not change the results.
[Put Table 13 here]
The results in Table 8 to Table 13 show that, overall, our results are robust to model
specications. Both fundamental and market measures of liquidation value have a signicant
impact on a rms debt capacity.
5 Conclusion
To test the Shleifer and Vishny (1992) hypothesis that the asset liquidation value inuences
a rms debt capacity, we focus on asset quality. The real estate industry provides an ideal
setting to test the cross-sectional patterns of rmsnancing choices, since the value of
real assets is relatively easier to identify and measure. In this setting, asset quality not
only encompasses the quality of the tenants who occupy the building, but also the location
quality of an area. To determine location quality we use its economic base (mixture of various
industries) as a proxy, since real estate is xed in location and the health of the local economy
inuences the cash ow of the tenants. Our tenant quality measure reects the asset quality
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from a shorter-term perspective. Since our metric of industry concentration (economic base)
within local markets captures the long-term redeployability notion of Benmelech, Garmaise,
and Moskowitz (2005), we essentially control for such long-term equilibrium vis-à-vis the
industry concentration.
We construct a valuation model to determine the factors that should inuence liquidation
value and debt capacity. We then test whether our model predicts the observed choices that
rms make in terms of their choice to issue debt or equity. We nd that as predicted,
rms with low asset liquidation values are less likely to issue debt to raise additional funds.
When controlling for traditional factors that explain rm nancing decision, we still nd
signicant evidence that supports Shleifer and Vishnys hypothesis. Asset quality is an
important determinant of both liquidation value and debt capacity. Firms that issue debt
not only have higher quality tenants, but also hold assets in geographical markets that have
a more diverse mix of industries relative to rms that issue equity. For rms such as hotels,
apartments and self-storage, whose assets are not occupied by long-term tenants we cannot
easily observe the fundamental measures of asset quality. The rms nancing choices rely
more heavily on the overall real asset market conditions in these situations.
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Appendix: Model with Cash Flow Growth
In Section 1, we assume that the rm generates a constant cash ow. We extend the basic
model by introducing cash ow growth. Assuming the rms cash ow grows at a constant
rate g, then Equations (1) and (2) become
V0 = E0
Z 
0
e rtegtI dt+ e rV1

; (8)
and
V1 = E0
"Z  0
0
e rt
 
1  e t egtI dt+ e r 0V1# , (9)
which lead Equations (3) and (4) to
V1 =
I
r
(r + )

1
r   g +    
1
r   g + + 

, (10)
and
V0 =
I
r   g +  +

r + 
V1. (11)
Taking the particial derivatives of liquidation value V1 in respect to asset quality  and
resale discount ; we have the following:
@V1
@
=
I (r + )
r (r   g +   )2 > 0 (12)
@V1
@
=   I (r + )
r (r   g +   ) < 0 (13)
Therefore under the assumptions of cash ow growth, we can still obtain the fundamental
relationships stated in Section 2.1 and Section 2.2.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics of the independent variables of REIT security
issuance decisions for the sample of 1,043 observations.
Variable Observation Mean S.D. Min Max
Asset Quality (Tenant Z-score) 1043 3.87 2.12 -3.87 16.81
Firesale Discount (%) 1043 8.86 0.69 7.96 11.81
Lease Maturity (years) 1043 3.88 1.69 0.00 5.56
Loss Severity (%) 1043 30.99 9.48 0.00 64.53
Leverage Ratio 1043 0.48 0.13 0.09 0.97
Protability (%) 1043 3.50 4.36 -8.11 76.57
Market-to-book 1043 1.14 0.24 0.56 1.78
Dilution 1043 0.10 0.16 0.00 3.09
FFO Growth (%) 1043 9.87 32.98 -96.57 185.92
Earning Volatility (%) 1043 0.30 0.18 0.01 10.09
Size 1043 14.91 1.14 9.55 17.20
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Table 7: Di¤erence in Means
This table presents the sample means and sample standard errors of the dependent and
independent variables in our regression analysis of REITsnew debt and equity o¤erings.
Our sample comprises 1,043 observations over the period January 2000 to December 2009.
We report t-statistics and their signicance levels on di¤erence in means. *, **, and ***
indicates statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Debt O¤erings Equity O¤erings
Mean S.E. Mean S.E. t-stat
Measures of Liquidation Value
Asset Quality 4.01 2.01 3.75 2.20 1.92 *
Firesale Discount 8.68 0.60 9.02 0.72 -8.31 ***
Loss Severity 30.46 9.56 31.45 9.40 -1.70 *
Control Variables
Lease Maturity 3.90 1.61 3.86 1.76 0.47
Leverage 0.47 0.11 0.50 0.15 -4.09 ***
Protability 3.30 2.90 3.67 5.31 -1.39
Market-to-book 1.16 0.24 1.13 0.23 1.83 *
Dilution 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.20 -3.78 ***
FFO Growth 5.11 31.21 13.99 33.92 -4.37 ***
Earning Volatility 0.31 0.18 0.29 0.17 1.23
Size 15.43 0.99 14.46 1.08 15.10 ***
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Table 8: Logit Regression with Asset Quality as Firms Liquidation Value
This table presents the multivariate logit regression results we obtain for REITs incremental -
nancing decisions using a sample of 1,043 observations. The dependent variable is set to one for a
new bond issue, and zero for an equity issue. We measure liquidation value by the industry con-
centration ratio of REIT top markets and the revenue-weighted average Altman Z-score of major
tenants. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total market assets, where we dene market assets as
the total book assets plus the di¤erence between the market value of equity and the book value of
equity. The growth rate of funds from operations (FFO Growth) is the annual percentage change
in such funds. Dilution is the total amount of o¤ering divided by the market cap prior to the new
issue. We measure protability by the return on average assets (ROAA). Market-to-book is the
total book assets divided by the total market value of assets. Earning Volatility is the standard de-
viation of FFO over the past three years. Rating Dummy is a dummy variable that takes a value of
1 if the rm has either a bond rating or a commercial paper rating and zero otherwise. Z-statistics
are shown in the line below the coe¢ cient. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. For any independent variable that is statistically signicant
at 10% and above, we provide economic signicance with Change in Probability showing the change
in proability of issuing debt when the independent variable changes one standard deviation.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Change Change Change
Coe¢ cient in Prob. Coe¢ cient in Prob. Coe¢ cient in Prob.
Asset Quality 0.074*** 3.9% 0.071** 3.7% 0.092*** 4.7%
2.226 2.086 2.636
Firesale Discount -0.560*** -9.1% -0.606*** -9.8% -0.512*** -8.3%
-4.491 -4.497 -3.599
Lease Maturity 0.043 0.030
0.926 0.567
Leverage -3.514*** 1.2%
-4.050
Protability -0.036
-1.403
Market-to-book -0.167
-0.398
Dilution 1.129** 1.2%
2.240
FFO Growth -0.005* -7.6%
-1.687
Earning Volatility 4.152
0.083
Rating Dummy 1.771*** 1.783*** 1.537***
8.103 8.125 6.642
Size 0.479*** 13.6% 0.463*** 13.2% 0.622*** 17.5%
5.004 4.751 5.701
Intercept -4.001** -3.512* -4.667**
-1.956 -1.661 -2.085
Pseudo R2 0.214 0.215 0.231
Log Likelihood -566.0 -565.6 -553.8
Observations 1043 1043 1043
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Table 9: Robustness Check - Regression Results with Historical Loss Severity
Rates as Firms Liquidation Value
This table presents the multivariate logit regression results of REITs incremental nancing de-
cisions. Model 4 uses 1,300 observations with the rm-level loss severity rate we construct using
historical loss severity rates across di¤erent property types. Model 5 tests the role of rm-level loss
severity index in REITsnancing choice for a sample of rms that do not have tenant information
(363 observations). Model 6 jointly tests the role of loss severity in addition to asset quality and
resale discount in explaining REITsnancing choice (1043 observations). It shows that when
asset quality and resale discount are in place, the explaintionary power of historical loss severity
is signicantly reduced. The dependent variable is set to one for a new bond issue, and zero for
an equity issue. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total market assets, where we dene market
assets as the total book assets plus the di¤erence between the market value of equity and the book
value of equity. Funds from operations (FFO) growth is the annual percentage change in such
funds. Dilution is the total amount of o¤ering divided by the market cap prior to the new issue.
We measure protability by the return on average assets (ROAA). Market-to-book is the total book
assets divided by the total market value of assets. Earning Volatility is the standard deviation of
FFO over the past three years. Rating Dummy is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if
the rm has either a bond rating or a commercial paper rating and zero otherwise. Z-statistics
are shown in the line below the coe¢ cient. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. For any independent variable that is statistically signicant
at 10showing the change in proability of issuing debt when the independent variable changes one
standard deviation.
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Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Change Change Change
Coe¢ cient in Prob. Coe¢ cient in Prob. Coe¢ cient in Prob.
Loss Severity -0.017*** -3.9% -0.069*** -12.0% -0.005
-2.713 -4.910 -0.657
Asset Quality 0.087*** 4.4%
2.493
Firesale Discount -0.531*** -8.1%
-3.665
Leverage -2.389*** -7.2% -1.848 -4.9% -3.577*** -10.1%
-3.471 -1.587 -4.199
Protability -0.051** -5.3% -0.053 -0.039
-2.032 -1.118 -1.629
Market-to-book -0.023 0.590 -0.158
-0.069 0.947 -0.377
Dilution 1.142** 4.5% 1.935*** 7.0% 1.076** 4.2%
2.430 2.770 2.094
FFO Growth -0.005** -3.9% 0.005 -0.004
-1.964 1.216 -1.520
Earning Volatility 20.99 232.00*** 9.4% 24.86
1.469 4.037 1.325
Rating Dummy 1.678*** 2.797*** 1.551***
8.148 4.967 6.629
Size 0.665*** 18.8% 0.713*** 19.3% 0.611*** 17.2%
7.848 3.291 5.569
Intercept -9.695*** -11.80*** -4.254*
-7.504 -3.833 -1.890
Pseudo R2 0.219 0.343 0.233
Log Likelihood -698.4 -163.8 -552.8
Observations 1300 363 1043
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